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     With growing interest in the view that macroeconomics should incorporate 
departures from rationality, many economists have attempted to explain the 
economy by careful observation of individuals‟ behavior. It is often assumed in 
standard macroeconomics that firms face fixed costs of changing prices that 
lead to sticky prices. Marketing surveys reveal, however, that the primary 
reason firms keep their prices rigid is due to the concern of antagonizing and 
thus losing their customers. In this paper we study recent behavioral economic 
models, in particular behavioral Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium 
(DSGE) models.  To investigate the fitness of these behavioral price-setting 
models into the real economy, we estimate the log-linearized version of the 
behavioral price setting model from Rotemberg (2005) using Bayesian 
estimation methods. Then we compare the obtained estimation results to the 
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Bayesian estimation results of the standard New Keynesian 3 equation model.  
The comparison of estimated results to the results of the standard New 
Keynesian model allowed us to conclude that when the steady state rate of 
inflation equals zero, the behavioral model and the standard New Keynesian 
model display similar impulse response patterns, albeit they exhibit some 
differences in the magnitude of the response. Moreover, when the steady state 
rate of inflation is positive, the behavioral and the standard New Keynesian 
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1     Introduction 
 
     It seemed, at least until the eruption of the financial crisis in 2007, as if 
macroeconomics had reached its zenith of success. The economy of the 
industrial world was experiencing macroeconomic stability with low and stable 
inflation, high and prolonged economic growth, and stability in many economic 
and financial variables. There was a general consensus among economists that 
the cause of this economic moderation was at least in part due to the new 
insights provided by modern macroeconomic theory. In this theory, a rational 
agent continuously optimizes his utility using all information that is available 
to him. Despite their rational optimization, individual agents sometimes do 
make mistakes. However, they do not make systematic mistakes, and as a 
consequence, stability is brought to the economy. Although there was an 
agreement that macroeconomic variables could be subjected to large changes, 
the causes of these large changes were always attributed to sources outside the 
world of rational agents. Thus, the economy was modeled as a world that was 
regularly hit by an exogenous shock, but where rational individuals had a 
complete understanding of the world and continuously strived to make optimal 
decisions.  
     To some degree, the financial and economic upheavals following the crash in 
the US subprime market have undermined this view of fully rational and 
informed agents, and its subsequent economic stability. Instead, the view that 
macroeconomics should incorporate departures from rationality began to gain 
attention. With growing interest in departures from rationality, many 
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economists attempted to explain the economy by careful observation of 
individuals‟ behavior.         
     The goal of this paper is to study recent behavioral economic models, in 
particular behavioral Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models.  
In macroeconomics, it is often assumed that firms face a fixed cost of changing 
prices that lead to sticky prices. Marketing surveys reveal, however, that the 
primary reason firms keep their prices rigid is due to the concern of 
antagonizing and thus losing their customers. This literature had been 
previously covered by Rotemberg (2005), who introduces the concept of altruism 
and fair pricing. Specifically, using the information about the firm‟s marginal 
cost, consumers assess whether a price increase is “fair”. For instance, if the 
amount of price increase is larger than the corresponding increase in marginal 
cost, consumers will view this price increase as unfair, which triggers 
consumers‟ anger. This will lead to a sharp decline in sales, and therefore, in 
order to avoid consumers‟ anger, firms will keep their prices stable.  
     Similarly, in his more recent work, Rotemberg (2010) introduces the concept 
of  “consumer regret”. Observing an increase in price of a storable good, 
consumer shows regret for not having purchased more of it in advance. In an 
attempt to appear altruistic to their consumers, firms internalize this consumer 
regret into their cost function. This kind of modeling generates a result akin to 
menu cost model, and produces nominal stickiness.  
     In this paper, I introduce several existing behavioral price-setting models. To 
investigate the fitness of these behavioral price-setting models into the real 
economy, I estimate the log-linearized version of the behavioral price setting 
model from Rotemberg (2005) using Bayesian estimation method. Then I 
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compare the obtained estimation results to the Bayesian estimation results of a 
basic New Keynesian model.   
     The paper proceeds as follows. The next section briefly covers related 
literature on sticky prices for behavioral and non-behavioral models. Section 3 
presents the behavioral pricing model from Rotemberg (2005). Section 4 then 
analyzes and compares the estimated results of the behavioral and the standard 
new Keynesian model, and section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2     Literature Review 
 
2.1     Non-Behavioral Price Setting  
 
     The size of the real effects of monetary policy on the economy is the central 
issue in monetary policy analysis. With the availability of micro-level data, 
recently there has been a surge of empirical work to study this issue. One of the 
key factors used in these studies to examine to size of the real effects of 
monetary policy is the frequency of price changes. Monetary policy‟s real effects 
on the economy depend crucially on the stickiness of prices. If price series 
exhibit frequent price changes, then monetary policy shock will have only small 
real effects. In contrast, if prices change infrequently, the monetary shock will 
have significant real effects. However, the frequency of the price change in the 
data crucially depends on how sales are treated in the data since a sizable 




Source: P. Kehoe and V. Midrigan, “Sales and the Real Effects of Monetary Policy,” Working 
Paper 652, 2007     
                                                                   
Figure 1: Example of price series 
 
Figure 1 shows a typical price series, namely the price of a six-pack of Diet 
A&W Cream Soda. All periods in which the dashed line does not equal the solid 
line are defined to be sales. This figure makes clear that sales are frequent 
while other types of price changes are rare. Excluding sales excludes most of the 
price changes in the original price series. Another fact that we can note from 
this figure is that price changes are large and the price changes tend to spend a 
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lot of time at only a couple of values. This pattern is an archetype of retail 
pricing. As already mentioned, monetary policy‟s real effects on the economy 
depend crucially on the rigidity of prices. In this sense, figure 1 poses a 
conundrum because the price path displays great flexibility on the one hand, 
but also exhibits substantial stickiness on the other. Two most widely used 
methods of dealing with sales are the take-sales-out approach and the leave-
sales-in approach. Take-sales-out approach excludes sales from the data, writes 
down a model without sales, and then matches the frequency of price changes to 
the data with sales excluded. The leave-sales-in approach includes sales in the 
data, writes down a model-without sales, and then matches the frequency of 
price changes to the data with sales included. Sale is treated just like any other 
price change in the leave-sales-in approach, whereas a sale is treated as no 
price change in the take-sales-out approach. Kehoe and Midrigan extend 
existing sticky price models by adding a motive for sales and show that the 
model can explain most of the patterns of sales in the data. Moreover, they 
evaluate the existing approaches and document that neither approximates well 
the real effects of money in an economy where sales are explicitly modeled.  
    Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) analyzed the nature of price setting by using 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) microdata, and documented the empirical 
characteristics of the different types of price changes in the U.S. economy. They 
focus on the price changes generated by temporary sales and shed light on the 
question of whether the macroeconomic implication of price rigidity is 
determined by the relative frequency of different types of price changes.  One of 
their key findings from the U.S. data is that sale price changes display 
significantly different empirical features compared to regular price changes, in 
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a sense that sale price changes are much more transient than regular price 
changes. By excluding sales from the definition of price changes, they document 
a price change of approximately 8 to 11 months. Bils and Klenow (2004), in 
contrast, treat sales as any other price change in the data and document that 
price changes about every 4.3 months. This conclusion shows that when sales 
are included in the data, prices are flexible, whereas prices are sticky when 
sales are excluded. Another interesting feature of the price change documented 
by Nakamura and Steinsson is that the frequency of price increases strongly 
covary with the inflation rate, whereas the frequency of price decreases and the 
size of price changes do not. Moreover, price adjustments exhibit seasonality, 
and one-third of non-sale price changes are price decreases.  
     To address the issue of whether nominal rigidities are important for 
macroeconomists, Eichenbaum et al (2009) have conducted an empirical work 
using weekly scanner data set and documented that nominal rigidities do not 
necessarily take the form of sticky prices. Instead, they found out that nominal 
rigidities take the form of inertia in reference prices and costs. Reference prices 
(costs) are defined as the most often quoted price (cost) within a given time 
period. The duration of reference prices and costs turns out to be much more 
inertial compared to weekly prices and costs. Related literature on nominal 
rigidities has generally assumed that these rigidities exhibit the form of sticky 
prices, and that the prices do not respond rapidly to shocks. Eichenbaum et al 
(2009), however, reveal that there exists significant persistence in reference 
prices and costs and thus display a type of rigidity that is not present in 
conventional macroeconomic models.  
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     In line with Eichenbaum et al (2009), in order to investigate whether and 
how to incorporate temporary price reductions into models of price setting, and 
whether price changes due to sales have implications for theories of monetary 
neutrality, Chevalier and Kashyap (2011) explore retailers‟ strategic price-
discrimination for price determination in the presence of heterogeneous 
consumers. They model two types of consumers, “loyals” who buy only one 
brand and do not strategically time purchases, and “bargain hunters” who shop 
for low-priced products both across brands and across time. They show that in 
this setting, retailers optimally choose long periods of constant regular prices 
disturbed by frequent temporary sales. They also show that the effective price 
paid is approximated by a weighted average of the fixed weight average list 
price and the lowest price available, namely the “best price”. These results 
suggest that sales are important even for macroeconomists, and that sales 
should not be neglected.  
 
 
2.2     Behavioral  Aspects of Price Setting 
 
     According to canonical economic literature, consumers make effective use of 
price information to maximize their consumption-based utility subject to the 
constraint that the total value of their purchases cannot exceed their income. In 
other words, in the standard economics analysis, consumers view prices as mere 
incentives to guide their purchases. Some consumers, however, appear to 
display unsophisticated behavior when using price information to plan their 
consumptions. Consumers‟ imperfect rationality is a departure from the 
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cognitive assumptions of standard economic analysis, but can nevertheless 
explain a number economic phenomena, including price rigidity.  
     Consumers sometimes display emotional reactions to price changes, such as 
anger and regret. Moreover, as opposed to being purely selfish, consumers‟ 
welfare is sometimes affected by the welfare of others. According to Blinder et 
al (1998) and Fabiani et al (2006), when firms are asked why they keep their 
prices rigid, their reply was that they do so in order to avoid angering their 
customers. In line with this observation, Rotemberg (2011) constructs a model 
where firms act as if they were altruistic in order to avoid triggering consumers‟ 
anger. If customers deem firms to be insufficiently benevolent towards them, 
they might respond negatively by not purchasing the product from the firm. 
Therefore, in order to avoid these negative reactions, firms have no choice but to 
internalize customers‟ emotions. The firm‟s desire to appear altruistic towards 
the consumers can lead them to adopt third-degree price discrimination based 
on the income differences of consumer classes while forswearing third-degree 
price discrimination that is based on the differences in the elasticity of demand. 
This model can also explain why prices show greater response to changes in 
factor costs than to changes in demand, despite the fact that their impact on the 
marginal cost is the same.  
     Furthermore, in order to avoid antagonizing their customers, firms have to 
internalize the regret and disappointment that customers experience when the 
price that they face is higher than a price that was available to them previously. 
Regret greatly matters in consumers‟ decision making. People‟s desire to avoid 
confronting regrets and blaming themselves for undesirable outcomes leads 
them to change their course of action.  
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     If the price of a storable good increases, customers regret not having 
purchased the product earlier. Likewise, customers show regret for not having 
waited if they notice a price decrease. Although most of the formal literature 
deriving price rigidity has put emphasis on administrative menu costs, 
Rotemberg (2010) analyzes firms‟ price changing pattern when they empathize 
with the regret costs of their consumers.  
     An interesting evidence of this argument is reported from an experimental 
comparison of two treatment groups. In one treatment, individuals are not 
informed about what would have happened under an alternative course of 
action, whereas they are informed in the other treatment. Cooke et al (2001) 
report a case where subjects are faced with a sequence of price offers and must 
make a purchase. In one treatment group, subjects do not see offers after they 
make a purchase while they do in the second treatment group. In an attempt to 
avoid the regret of paying “too much”, subjects were less inclined to make a 
purchase in the treatment where they continued to see offers after the purchase.  
     Both regret and anger are emotions that are triggered when people realize 
that they are worse off than they could have been. One difference between 
regret and anger is that, in the case of anger, someone else is blamed for the 
undesirable outcome. According to Berkowitz and Harmon-Jones (2004), anger 
is “linked associatively with an urge to injure some target”. In terms of the 
traditional utility, angry people‟s utility increases when the target of their 
anger is injured or harmed. As an illustrative example, when Apple reduced the 
price of iPhone by $200 in September 5, 2007, many customers who had bought 
the product before the price reduction posted many angry messages. When 
Kahneman, Knetch and Thaler (1986) asked their respondents whether they 
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deem it as fair for a store to raise the price of its snow shovels after a snow 
storm from $15 to $20, approximately 80 percent of the respondents viewed it 
as either “unfair” or “very unfair”.  
     One interesting theory by Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986) is that 
consumers feel that they are entitled to their “reference transaction”, while 
firms are entitled to their “reference” level of profits. By reference transaction 
and profits, they refer to past offers made by the firm and the firms‟ past profits. 
In this sense, consumers are entitled to the same price of a snow shovel as 
before the storm because the firm‟s profits will not decline even the prices are 
kept constant. Likewise, price increases that are accompanies by cost increases 
are viewed as fair because, although consumers can no longer access their 
reference transactions, firms come closer at maintaining their reference profit 
levels.  
     Several marketing studies show that customers engage in very little product 
comparison on a typical shopping trip. In his recent paper, Nicolas Vincent 
(2011) explores the implications of firms‟ fear of customer anger and customers‟ 
lack of product comparison for macroeconomic fluctuations. In Vincent‟s model, 
it is assumed that comparing prices and characteristics of alternative brands is 
time-consuming for a consumer. While some consumers are bargain hunter 
whose opportunity costs from shopping is zero, most customers are loyal to a 
certain firm as long as posted prices are not raised. When consumers observe a 
price increase, they receive signal that a better alternative may be available, 
and thus they engage in search for alternatives. Unlike standard economic 
models, firms are free to adjust their nominal prices because they do not face 
any menu costs. However, they are aware of the fact that their pricing decisions 
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will affect their future profits by affecting their customer base. This micro-
founded mechanism generates price stickiness and is also coherent with 
frequently observed sales at the retail level.  
      Now let us discuss some price setting anomalies displayed by the firm. 
Consider a case where firms charge prices with lump sum components and a 
“per unit” component that is well below the marginal cost. As an illustrative 
example provided by Della Vigna and Malmandier (2006), many health clubs 
offer a plan with a monthly fee that allows buyers of the plan an unlimited 
number of visits. That is, the “per visit” fee equals zero. This is a puzzling 
phenomenon considering the fact that health clubs‟ marginal cost is not zero 
and that marginal cost rises with the number of visits.  
      One explanation for the above case that is provided by Della Vigna and 
Malmendier (2004) is that consumers are overconfident about their tendency to 
use certain services. Many consumers strongly believe that they will benefit 
disproportionately if services are priced at zero marginal price, even if they 
know that an average consumer generally does not benefit from such a price 
plan. Another plausible explanation is that people wish to avoid facing the 
tradeoff between paying a price and consuming. In other words, consumers 
avoid the recurrence of purchasing decisions by making a big one decision at the 
beginning. Survey evidence by Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) for a variety of 
services such as health club plans and foods during cruises, people tend to 
prefer to pay a fixed fee at the beginning than paying a fee per-use even if the 
total cost and usage are equal.  
     Another price setting anomaly that is encountered in our daily lives is the 
price that ends with a digit 9. Firms extensively charge a price with this ending 
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because studies reveal that consumers are particularly attracted to purchasing 
products whose price ends with a 9. A study by Twedt (1965) and Levy et al 
(2007) reports that over half of the prices that they observe end in the digit 9.  
One explanation for this observation is that people tend to absorb price 
information from left to right and recall only the first few significant digits. 
Therefore, firms are less inclined to charge a price ending with a zero than a 
slightly lower price that ends with a 9.  
     An interesting observation by Levy et al. (2007) is that prices ending in 9 are 
less likely to be changed than prices ending in other digits. At the same time, if 
it does change, the typical magnitude of price change is larger for prices ending 
in 9. Therefore, it follows that prices with 9 endings are more sticky.  
 
 
3     The Model 
 
     In this section, we present Rotember‟s (2005) behavioral price setting model.  
This model describes customer anger at price increases, and provides 
implications in the frequency of price adjustment. We first consider a one-period 
model with fairness concerns, and then move on to the multi-period general 






3.1     A One-Period Model with Fairness Concerns 
 
     A unit mass of households each produce his own differentiated product, and 
each household, which is denoted by i, obtains a utility at period t which is 
given by 
 
            
      
       
   
     where     
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Household‟s utility function u is concave and increasing while his cost function 
  is convex and increasing. A random variable indicating the cost of production 
is denoted by   
 , the output of household i at period t is given by   
 , and the 
household‟s consumption of good z at period t is denoted as   
      Maximization 
of this utility implies that   
    
    , where   
  denotes household i‟s total 
expenditure on consumer goods. This implies that   
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Thus, if all households maximize (1) and if producers sell the quantity that is 
demanded by households,   
  would equal           
     
  , where    is the total 
household expenditure at period t.  
     There is a threshold price level    
  such that consumers would stop buying 
the product despite the fact that their utility maximization leads to a positive 
amount of purchase at this price. From this kind of consumer behavior we can 
infer that consumers are actually maximizing a utility function that is more 
complicated than (1). This new type of utility function incorporates consumer‟s 
perception of whether firms are being altruistic towards them. In fact, 
consumers expect firm i to set a price such that maximizes  
 
            
        
 
    
 
   
 ,                                                                          (3) 
  
where    is a parameter that measures firm i‟s altruism level  while    
 
 is 
household j‟s  base level utility that he gains when he does not consume any 
amount of good i. Note that when    takes the value of zero, firm‟s maximization 
problem would be equal to a prototypical profit maximization problem in the 
absence of fairness considerations. However, firms keep     above zero in the 
presence of fear for antagonizing their customers. The main difference of the 
behavioral pricing model from prototypical non-behavioral pricing model lies in 
this non-zero value of     
     For simplicity, assume that in the one period model, the producer spends all 
his earned revenue in consuming goods at period t, so that   
    
   
 .  Thus, 
since   
    
    , household‟s utility   
      
       
   
   can be represented as 
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Thus, the maximization of the producer‟s utility function leads to a price 
satisfying 
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In a symmetric equilibrium where all households have identical marginal 
utilities, the optimal price satisfies 
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Moreover, differentiating   
  with respect to  , we get 
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and differentiating   
  with respect to  
  we get 
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Thus a higher value of the altruism parameter,  , leads to a lower   
 , whereas 
higher cost,   
  leads to a higher   
 .  
     Consumers are unaware of the producers‟ costs or levels of altruism 
parameters. Therefore, by using the information available to them, consumers 
test whether they can reject the null hypothesis that the altruism parameter of 
the producer is at least equal to   , the minimal level of altruism expected from 
the producer. If consumers can reject this hypothesis, consumers will stop 
purchasing goods from this producer. Therefore, household j determines his 
consumption by maximizing 
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where    
  is the baseline value of   
  when consumers do not make any 
purchases,    is an arbitrarily large number, and   is a function that takes the 
value of zero if customers cannot reject the hypothesis that   is at least     
Alternatively, if consumers are able to reject the hypothesis that        the step 
function                          The actual hypothesis that the consumers are 
testing is the hypothesis that the firm‟s marginal cost that is implied by 
equation (6) with      is consistent with the consumers‟ subjective distribution 
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concerning these costs. This hypothesis would be rejected if the price set by the 
producer is above the critical level    
 , because this would suggest that the 
producers‟ costs are implausibly large.  
     Let G  be the p.d.f. over the critical value    
  that the producers have. If the 
firm knows the true value of    
   this p.d.f. would take the form of a step function. 
Supposing that producers are selfish,   
  maximizes 
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and the corresponding first order condition is 
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The solution to this first order condition is to set   
     if         for the 




    
    equal zero. Otherwise, the optimal price 
would be lower than   . In this case, there are two subcases to consider. In the 
first case, the price   
  maximizing (8) is interior, and thus at this price equation 
(9) is satisfied as an equality. In the second case, the price   
  that maximizes 
equation (8) is the price    that satisfies          which therefore guarantees 
that consumers regard this price as fair.  
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     If the optimal price    satisfies the first order condition (9) because       
   the firm is able to choose its first best action. If instead       were greater 
than zero, and if the price that maximizes (8) is lower than its price in the 
previous period, the firm would keep its price equal to     .  Keeping the price 
equal to its previous level allows the firm to maintain a price that is closer to its 
unconstrained optimum without generating the possibility of antagonizing 
customers.  
      If instead, the price that maximizes (8) is    such that makes       equal zero, 
the prices would be expected to rise because by doing so, the firm is able to 
increase the value of its objective function without creating the risk of consumer 
complaints. Now suppose that the optimum is interior and the price that 
satisfies the first order condition (9) is very close to     . If this is the case, it is 
better for the firm to keep its prices constant because the firm gets         
        by keeping prices constant, whereas he will get [      
           
         if he raises the price to   
 . Since     
 ) is greater than zero, and since 
     and   
  are sufficiently close, [      
                    might be less than 
               . Hence, the prices would stay rigid in the sense of staying 
constant.  
     Producers‟ fear of antagonizing customers works as a fixed cost of changing 
prices, and this cost makes producers to keep their prices constant. The 
difference of this model from the one with simple fixed costs, is that not only the 
price change par se, but also the size of the price change matters as well.  
According to Zbaracki et al (2004), salesmen are more worried about customers‟ 
retaliation for large price increases than for small price increases. If customers 
have diffuse priors about the level of costs, but are precisely informed about the 
 25 
marginal changes in costs between two consecutive periods, they are more 
likely to react negatively to large price changes. Therefore, price increases than 
are not accompanied by corresponding increases in costs are highly likely to 
trigger customer anger. If we assume that customers assess firm‟s fairness only 
when the firm changes its prices, and if the optimal price at period t,   
 , is 
interior and is close to the price level in the previous period, firm is more likely 
to keep its prices constant.  
 
 
3.2     A Multi-Period General Equilibrium Model 
 
     In this section, above presented model is extended to a dynamic setting. 
Suppose, that in the absence of fairness concerns, that household i‟s utility 
function at period t is given by 
 
              
   
  
   .                                                                                      (10) 
 
Each individual consumes a fixed fraction       at period t, which implies that 
the equilibrium value of the marginal utility,     is equal across ex ante 
identical households. Also, let us suppose that households are able to borrow 
and lend at a riskless nominal rate     Therefore, households are indifferent 
between consuming an additional unit of consumption in one period and 
expecting to consume               additional units of consumption in the 
next period. Putting this into an equation yields 
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        .                                                             (11) 
 
     Despite the fact that all firms are identical in our setting, consumers‟ beliefs 
about what constitutes fair pricing for any given firm evolves stochastically 
from period to period. It is believed by consumers that the cost   
  of any given 
firm takes the value of either   
  or   
 , where   
    
    
 . Moreover, 
consumers independently draw signals equal to    
  from the p.d.f.       , for each 
firm. It is viewed by the households that these signals are in fact equal to   
  
plus a random measurement error z which is drawn from the p.d.f       
Therefore, when customer receives a signal less or equal to    
 , the consumers‟ 
subjective probability that the true value of the cost is   
  equals      
    
  . 
     In a multi-period model, firms do not ever find it optimal to decrease their 
prices when the steady state level of inflation is sufficiently high. Therefore, 
consumer reactions to price decreases may be unimportant.  
     Consumers determine whether the new price   
  set by the firm is consistent 
with      for each of the two possible values of cost by using equation (6), 
which we re-state here for convenience: 
 





   
 
     
  
  
 .                                                                                                                  
 
If the true cost of the firm is   
 , a firm can raise its price without triggering 
consumer anger as long as 
 
            
    
   
 
      
  
  
 .                                                                                 (12) 
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 Suppose that the firm changes its price but keeps its below the bound 
presented in equation (12). Given a signal as   
 , since consumers‟ subjective 
probability that the firm‟s true cost is   
  equals      
    
  , consumers will 
reject the hypothesis that the firm‟s altruism parameter is at least equal to    if 
 
                
    
    ,                                                                                (13) 
 
where   is the size of the test. Firms would be better off to maintain their prices 
from the previous period if their    
  is lower than the critical value of this test.  
     Assuming that firms know the value of the cost that consumers receive as 
signals, the probability that they keep their prices constant would be   , which 
is given by 
 
                 
        
                                                                           (14) 
 
If we let    and   
  to be constant over time, this model would be similar to the 
Calvo (1983) model. 
      In the Calvo model, the probability of changing prices,  , is fixed. The 
probability of changing prices, in contrast, is variable in our behavioral model 
and is a function of the signal    
 . In our model, when customers realize that a 
specific firm‟s cost is below some critical level, they stop purchasing products 
from this firm. However, in the presence of random measurement error, 
customers may not be able to determine clearly whether a firm‟s pricing is fair  
     Let us now suppose that producers can set price to any level whenever the 
condition in (13) is violated. Given full insurance markets, a dollar increase in 
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profits in period     increases expected utility of period   by    
              . 
Therefore, the optimal price would maximize 
           
           
       
 
      
            
  
 
    
 
   
        
  
 
    
 
  
                             
 
over   
   Notice that since   is fixed in the Calvo model, a firm would maximize 
                 
               
  
 
    
 
   
        
  
 
    
 
  
               
as opposed to equation (15).    
     The first order condition derived from (15) is  
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Suppose that          
   and       is proportional to    
 .  Let    be   
    , 
and dividing it by    
     
   we obtain 
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where    denotes the inflation rate. The value of    will satisfy the condition (12) 
for sufficiently large values of   
   Therefore, firms whose costs are sufficiently 
large will change their prices according to equation (16).  
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     Since  




   
   
       







   
   
       
    
given the common choice of   
    ,  
 
                   
       
    
  
 
   
 
       
                                               (17) 
 
Equation (17) simply states that a fraction    of firms keep their prices constant 
by maintaining their price from the previous period, whereas a fraction       
of firms change their prices to   
 . In a steady state where inflation and the 
probability of changing prices are constant, this implies that 
 
          (                                                                               (18) 
 
     By differentiating equation (17), and using (18) to substitute for the steady 
state value of  , we can obtain 
 
               
        
   
      
      
     
   
  
          
   ,                                                  (19) 
 
where          and     denote the logarithmic deviations from steady state values 
of    , and  , respectively. 
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                                                                                       (20) 
 
where     denotes the logarithmic deviation from  . 
     The coefficient of    in equation (19) becomes zero when the steady state rate 
of inflation equals zero. Furthermore, the coefficient of    for equation (20) also 
becomes zero since    and    cancel each other out. Therefore, when the steady 
state rate of inflation equals zero, small variations in   do not have effects on 
the economy. When   takes the value of zero, the steady state value of   equals 
1.00, which implies that average price change of each firm equals zero. Thus, 
despite an increase in the number of firms changing their prices, the price level 
is generally not affected. When the steady state rate of inflation is positive, 
however,   is greater than 1. In this case, the typical price changer will increase 
his price, and therefore even a small variation in   will affect the price level.  
     Furthermore, suppose that the linearized reaction function for the central 
bank is given as 
 
                
       
         
                                                                          (21) 
 
     Also, suppose that     is given by 
 
                
      
      ,                                                                            (22) 
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where the parameter value of   
  is positive whereas that of   
  is negative. 
       In the following section, we provide empirical results to analyze how the 
economy responses to various shocks.  
 
4     Empirical Results 
 
4.1     Responses of the economy to the shock 
 
      In this section we analyze the response of the economy to mark-up shocks   
 , 
demand shocks   
 
, and monetary policy shocks   
 . Parameter values from the 
literature are used. Just as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), the discount 
factor   is set to .99,    is set to 1,    is set to 7.88, and   equals .47.  
While our analysis mainly focuses on the case where the steady state rate of 
inflation is 5 percent, we also analyze the case with the steady state rate 
ofinflation of 0% for comparison. Suppose that       and that the two 
parameters of the monetary policy rule,   
         
  take the value  
of .9. These high values for the parameters of the monetary policy rule ensure 
that monetary policy shock has persistent effects and also that the equilibrium 
is determinate. The parameter values of   
  and   






figure 2: Orthogonalized Shock to    for both constant and variable alpha when 
steady state rate of inflation is 5 percent  
 
 
4.1.1     Responses to Demand Shocks 
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Figure 2 illustrates responses of macroeconomic variables to demand shock 
when annual steady state inflation rate is given by 5 percent. Responses of 
variables for both constant and variable   are illustrated for comparison. 
It is clear that the direction of response for inflation, output and interest 
rate is equivalent regardless of whether   is variable or fixed: inflation, outcome 
and interest rate decreases as a response to a demand shock. Figure 2 also 
reports responses of   when   is given by  
 
                         
      
       
 
where   
      and   
       These parameters are such that make    to 
initially fall and then to rise.  
     One interesting observation is that the interest rate displays a hump-shaped 
response when   is variable whereas it always displays a negative slope in the 
case of a fixed     When   is fixed, the largest increase (although the absolute 
amount is trivial) in interest rate takes place in the immediate aftermath of the 
demand shock, where it increases by .006 percent. When   is variable, however, 
interest rate rises by approximately .003 percent, and it continues to increase 
until it reaches its peak after roughly 3 quarters.  
 
4.1.2    Responses to the Monetary Policy  
 
     Figure 3 illustrates responses of macroeconomic variables to a monetary 





figure 3: Orthogonalized Shock to    for both constant and variable alpha when steady 
state rate of inflation is 5 percent  
 
percent immediately after the shock for both fixed and variable  , and it 
reaches its steady state in roughly 10 quarters. Similarly, a monetary shock 
leads to an increase in interest rate by approximately 1 percent regardless of 
whether   is fixed or variable, and it reaches its steady state in 10 quarters. A 
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noteworthy observation is that when   is constant, the drop in inflation is 
largest in the quarter where monetary shock first hits the economy.  The 
response of the inflation when   is variable, however, differs in the sense that 
the largest reduction in inflation does not occur immediately after the shock. As 
can be seen from figure 3, the largest drop in inflation when   is variable takes 
place after 2 quarters. In Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), the largest response 
in inflation happens after two quarters, whereas Christiano et al (2005) report 
a longer delay with a maximum response after 9 quarters. By close observation, 
we can see that the fall in inflation is much smaller in the initial quarter than 
in the case where   is fixed. Inflation exhibits a fall by approximately .18 
percent with an initial increase in the rate of interest of .88 percent when   is 
fixed. When   is variable, in contrast, inflation initially decreases by only .06 
percent despite a .95 percent rise in interest rate. It is quite surprising to see 
that neither the response of output nor that of interest rates is significantly 
affected by these altered dynamics of inflation. 
 
 
4.1.3     Responses to Mark-up Shocks   
 
     Figure 4 reports the responses of macroeconomic variables to a mark up 
shock when annual steady state inflation rate is given by 5 percent. With a 
mark up shock, the inflation reports an initial increase of .06 percent for both 
constant and variable     For fixed    after an initial increase, inflation displays 




figure 4: Orthogonalized Shock to    for both constant and variable alpha when 
steady state rate of inflation is 5 percent  
 
similar path for variable    The only different is that the fall in inflation is 
much more slow and gradual when   is variable. The initial decrease in output 
is much larger when   is variable. In the latter case, output decreases by 6 
percent whereas it exhibits a decrease of 2 percent when   is fixed. Thus, the 
response path of output is much steeper when   is variable. 
 37 
 
figure 5: Orthogonalized shock to    (Responses with exogenous alpha) 
 
 
When inflation increases by approximately .6 percent, interest rate increases by 
approximately .5 percent. Once again, we are able to observe a hump shaped 
response of the interest rate when   is variable. When   is fixed, the largest 
increase in interest rate takes place in the immediately after the inflation shock. 
When   is variable, in contrast, the largest increase in interest rate occurs 
approximately 3 quarters after the shock. For a relatively modest difference in 
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inflation for constant and variable  ‟s after 3 quarters, interest rate for variable 
  and fixed   display a gap of approximately .7 percent.  
     We next consider the case where   is given exogenously. Suppose that the 
exogenous response of    is given by the following pattern: 
           
                                                       
   
 . 
 
With    set equal to 3, figure 5, figure 6, and figure 7 report the resulting 
responses of output, inflation and interest rates. The responses of output, 
inflation and interest rates to demand and mark up shocks do not vary whether 
  is fixed or variable. Thus the responses created by these variables 
demonstrate exactly the same path as that in the case where   is fixed.  The 
only variation between responses when   is fixed and variable can be observed 
by the impulse response to monetary shocks. Another thing to note is the 
response pattern of    immediately after the contraction,   drops by a large 
amount, then rises above its steady state value.  
     Figure 6 depicts the responses of inflation, output, and interest rates to 
monetary shock when   is determined exogenously, and when the steady state 
inflation rate is given by 5 percent. In the immediate aftermath of monetary 
contraction,   drops by approximately 3 percent, and then rises after a few 
quarters. Since   denotes the probability that firms keep their prices constant, 
this observation implies that the fraction of price adjusters rises as a result of 
monetary contraction, but that this fraction falls below its steady state after a 
few quarters. By observing the response of the inflation, we can clearly see that 
the response of inflation in delayed for several quarters because the largest 
drop in inflation takes place after approximately 7 quarters. 
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figure 6: Orthogonalized Shock to    (Responses with exogenous alpha) 
 
 
This response of inflation justifies the pattern that   takes, namely the initial 
rush of price adjustments and the subsequent reduction in the fraction of price 
adjusting firms. This initial sudden increase in price adjustments could be 
attributed to the reduction in  
 40 
 
figure 7: Orthogonalized Shock to    (Responses with exogenous alpha) 
 
 
   caused by the contractionary policy. It could also be attributed to a firm‟s 
desire to raise prices while they can still point to a recent relatively high 
inflation as their justification for price adjustment. Thus the responses of   
given in the above equation generated a pattern of inflation responses that 
make the responses of price adjustment assumed by the equation possible. 
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4.2     Parameter Estimates 
 
     In this section, we present parameter estimation results of the behavioral 
model obtained with Bayesian estimation techniques using three key 
macroeconomic quarterly US time series data over the period 1947:1  2004:4 
as observable variables: the log difference of real GDP, the log difference of the 
GDP deflator, and federal funds rate. Output is defined as 
LN((GDPC96/LNSindex)*100, where GDPC96 is the Real Gross Domestic 
Product and LNSindex is the Labor Force Status index, ages 16 and older. 
Inflation is defined as LN(GDPDEF/GDPDEF(-1))*100, where GDPDEF is 
Gross Domestic Product - implicit price deflator.  Interest rate is defined as 
(Federal Funds Rate)/4. All data are obtained from U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
 
 
4.2.1     Prior Distribution of the Parameters 
 
     In order to calculate the likelihood function of the observed data series, 
Kalman filter is used. This likelihood function needs to be combined with prior 
information for the model parameters in order to obtain the posterior 
distribution of the parameters. Table 1 gives an overview of our assumptions 
regarding the prior distributions of the estimated parameters. All the variances 
of the shocks are assumed to follow an Inverted Gamma distribution. Inverted 
Gamma distribution guarantees a positive variance with a rather large domain. 
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The parameters describing the monetary policy rule,   
  and   
 , are described by 
a Normal distribution with mean 0.920 and 0.880 and standard errors 0.0200 
and 0.0250, respectively. The fraction of firms keeping their prices constant,  , 
has a Beta distribution and fluctuates around 0.780 with a standard error of 
0.0230. Parameters describing    , namely,   
  and   
 , follow Gamma and 
Normal distributions, respectively, with mean 2.530 and  14.970 and standard 
errors 0.0323 and 0.0315, respectively. The discount factor,  , is described by a  
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4.1.2.     Posterior Estimates of the Parameters 
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Beta distribution with a prior mean of 0.970 and prior standard deviation 
0.0213. The prior mean of the steady state inflation rate is Normally distributed 
with a mean 0.052 and standard error 0.0360.  
     The rest of the parameters are assumed to be distributed as follows:   is set 
around 1.050 with a standard error of 0.0250,   is assumed to fluctuate around 
7.830 with a standard error of 0.0350, and   is set at 0.440 with a standard 
error of 0.0450. The prior distribution of    follows Beta distribution with a 
mean 0.600 and standard error 0.1000.  
     Table 2 summarizes the estimation results of the posterior distribution of 
the parameters from the behavioral pricing model, obtained by the Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm. It gives the prior mean, posterior mean, 5 and 95 
percentiles of the posterior distribution of the parameters. A sample of 50,000 
draws was created, where the first 10,000 draws were neglected  
     The posterior means of the parameters of the monetary policy rule,   
  and   
 , 
appear to be smaller than the values given from the previous literature. 
Whereas the prior mean of   
  is 0.920, the posterior mean equals 0.8009, and 
while the prior mean of   
  equals 0.880, its posterior mean equals 0.7242.  
Recall that in   
  and   
  were both equal to 0.9 in Rotemberg (2005). These 
rather high values for the parameters were given to ensure both that the 
monetary policy shock has persistent effects and that the equilibrium is 
determinate. However, we can observe from estimated results that   
  and   
  are 
in fact smaller. Thus it turns out that smaller values for the parameters of the 
monetary policy rule can also allow the effect of the monetary policy shock to be 
persistent.  
 45 
     The estimation result of the probability of keeping prices constant,    is also 
noteworthy. The prior mean of   is 0.780 whereas the posterior mean equals 
0.6869. Departure of the reset price from the average price, (i.e.  ) is larger 
when inflation is larger. Therefore, it is assumed in Rotemberg (2005) that 
when the annual steady state rate of inflation equals 5 percent, a typical price 
changing firm charges a price 5 percent above that the average price so that the 
steady state value of   takes the value of 1.05. The typical price changing firm 
is then raising its price by   
      , or         which equals 6.3 percent. Using 
equation (18), this value of   implies that firms change their prices 
approximately once a year and the probability of changing price equals .76.   
     According to our estimation results, however, the value of the posterior mean 
of   equals 0.6869. This is because our estimated posterior mean values for   
and   are 7.8343 and 0.0191, respectively. Therefore, when the steady state 
value of   is 1.05, a typical price changer will raise his price by approximately 7 
percent. Comparing the results of the Bayesian estimation with the results 
given in the literature provides interesting insights. The price increase rate is 
larger, and furthermore, the probability of keeping prices constant is lower in 
the estimated result. Thus, from what the estimation results reveal, a higher 
fraction of firms change their prices, and the magnitude of price increase is 
higher than the amount reported by previous studies.  
      Posterior mean of demand, monetary, and mark-up shocks are clearly 
different from those of the prior mean. The prior mean of the demand shock    
is 0.250 whereas the posterior mean is 8.0725. The prior mean of both monetary 
shock    and mark-up shock    is 1.000 while their posterior means are 0.5756 




figure 8: Bayesian posterior impulse response to demand shock 
 
 
     Figure 8 reports the posterior impulse responses of macroeconomic variables 
to a demand shock when annual steady state inflation rate is given by 5 percent 
for variable  . By comparing figure (8) with figure (2), we can clearly see that 
two figures reveal rather different responses to demand shocks. First of all, 
although the shapes of response of output are similar, the posterior impulse 
response exhibits much greater increase in output compared to that of the 
regular impulse response function from figure (2). Whereas the output increases 
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by 1 percent in the immediate aftermath of the shock in figure (2), the posterior 
impulse response of output increases by 8 percent. Furthermore, the posterior 
impulse response of output lasts longer compared to the impulse response of 
output in figure (2). One explanation for these observable differences is that the 
prior mean of the demand shock    is 0.250 whereas the value of its posterior 
mean equals 8.0725. This striking difference in the magnitude of shock could 
have resulted in a greater immediate increase of output for the posterior 
impulse response.  
     The posterior impulse response of interest rate to demand shock also 
demonstrates a similar hump shape pattern as the impulse response function of 
interest rate in figure (2). When the demand shock hits the economy, the 
interest rate increases immediately by approximately 0.003 percent. According 
to the posterior impulse response, however, in the immediate aftermath of the 
shock, the interest rate rises by 0.06 percent.  
     The posterior response of inflation to demand shock also exhibits a difference 
in magnitude compared to the impulse response of figure (2). In figure (2), the 
inflation increases by 0.003, and then gradually returns to its steady state. The 
posterior impulse response of inflation to demand shock, in contrary, initially 
rises by approximately 0.07 percent, and then also gradually returns to its 
steady state value.  
     Now, let us take a look at the movement of  . The posterior   responds more 
to the demand shock compared to the   in figure (2). Immediately after the 
demand shock hits the economy,   in figure (2) increases by 0.1 percent, 
whereas the posterior   increases by 1 percent. The difference in these two 
values is rather large, and thus it is possible to conclude that the Bayesian  
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figure 9: Bayesian posterior impulse response to monetary shock 
 
 
estimation method provides us an alternative view of the fraction of price 
adjusting firms. When the economy is hit by a demand shock, the demand for 
goods increases, and according to the Bayesian estimation, the fraction of firms 
keeping their prices constant increases by 1 percent. Therefore, our estimation 
using the data reveals that when the demand increases, more firms keep their 
prices constant. This result indeed makes sense. For instance, The L.A. Times 
of 30 January 1994 had reported that angry consumers threatened to boycott 
stores that raised prices after an earthquake. The reasoning behind this 
phenomenon is that customers will deem a price increase not accompanies by a 
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cost increase as unfair. As a result, when demand increases dramatically due to 
calamity alerts, prices for emergency supplies are kept constant, and store often 
run out.  
     Figure (9) displays the posterior impulse response of macroeconomic 
variables to the monetary shock when the steady state rate of inflation equals 5 
percent and when   is variable. First, let us look at the posterior impulse 
response of output to monetary shock. Again, despite their similarities in shape, 
the posterior impulse response and the impulse response in figure (3) display 
differences in terms of the magnitude of response. As it turns out, the posterior 
impulse response of output falls less than the impulse response of output in 
figure (3). One plausible explanation for this is that the posterior mean of the 
interest rate shock is approximately twice smaller than its prior mean. The 
prior mean of the monetary shock is 1 whereas the posterior mean equals 
0.5756. This difference in the size of the shock could have resulted in different 
responses of output.  
     The response pattern of interest rate is also as anticipated considering the 
size of the monetary policy shock. Since the posterior mean of the monetary 
shock is smaller than its prior mean, the response of the interest rate is also 
smaller for the posterior impulse response function. While the initial response 
of the interest rate in figure (3) is an increase by approximately 1 percent, the 
estimated posterior interest rate increases by 0.6 percent.  
     Likewise, although the inflation in figure (3) falls by      percent, the size of 
the drop in inflation is approximately       Moreover, the drop in inflation is 
largest after roughly 3 quarters after the shock first hits the economy. After 3 
quarters after the shock, the impulse response function of figure (3) drops by 0.1 
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percent. The posterior impulse response of inflation, in contrast, displays the 
largest drop of 0.05 percent.  
     This observation can be carefully linked with the movement of  . 
Approximately 5 quarters after the shock, the posterior   reaches its peak 0.7 
percent above its steady state, whereas the percent of firms keeping their prices 
constant is 1 percent above the steady state in figure (3). Since a higher fraction 
of firms change their prices from the posterior estimation results, and since 
these price adjustments are likely to accompany price increases, it is more 
likely that the drop in inflation is smaller in the case of the posterior estimation. 
In other words, according to our posterior estimation result, a higher fraction of 
firms increasing their prices offsets the effect of monetary shock that leads to a 
drop in inflation.  
Figure 10 reports the estimated posterior impulse responses of macroeconomic 
variables to inflation shock when the steady state rate of inflation equals 5 
percent and when   is variable. Notice that the response of the estimated 
posterior output drops by approximately 2.8 percent immediately after the 
shock. The output in figure (4), in contrast, initially falls by 6 percent. Therefore, 
according to our estimated posterior impulse response function, in the 
immediate aftermath of the inflation shock the posterior output responds less 
than the output of figure (4). This could partly be due to the fact that the 
estimated posterior mean of    is less than the given prior mean of   . While the 
posterior mean of    is 0.8662, its prior mean value equals 1. Although the 
estimated difference in the mean value of the inflation shock may not be large, 




figure 10: Bayesian posterior impulse response to mark-up shock 
 
 
Just as we have anticipated from the difference in the size of the inflation shock, 
the estimated posterior interest rate responds less to the shock compared to the 
interest rate in figure (4). Immediately after the shock, the interest rate in 
figure (4) rises by 0.5 percent, then reaches its peak (0.85 percent above the 
steady state) after approximately 3 quarters. The estimated posterior interest 
rate, in contrast, increases by 0.4 percent, and then reaches its peak (0.6 
percent above the steady state) after 3 quarters.  
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     Likewise, the effect of the mark-up shock on the estimated posterior inflation 
rate is lower than that of figure (4). Right after the shock hits, the posterior 
inflation increases by 0.5 percent, whereas the inflation in figure (4) rises by 0.6 
percent. Furthermore, although the response path of the estimated posterior 
inflation is always above its steady state value, the inflation in figure (4) falls 
below its steady state value after 5 quarters, and then gradually returns to its 
steady state.  
     The estimated posterior   and the   in figure (4) display analogous impulse 
response functions, both in terms of the shape and in terms of the magnitude of 
the response.  
 
 
5     Comparison with the standard  
        New Keynesian model 
 
5.1     New Keynesian Phillips Curve with zero trend inflation 
 
      In this subsection, we compare our estimated results of the behavioral price 
setting model with the standard 3 equation New Keynesian model. The IS 
equation and the Taylor rule are given equally as in Rotemberg‟s (2005) 
behavioral model. The only difference is in the Phillips curve, which is given by 
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The shock      is normally distributed around zero with variance   
   Specifically, 
  is a composite parameter that depends on the degree of price stickiness and 
firms‟ production technology, the coefficient   denotes the degree of price 
indexation (        and the autocorrelation    (        represents the 
persistence in the supply shock.  
     Figure 11 reports the response pattern of inflation, output, and interest rate 
in the standard New Keynesian 3 equation model. Impulse response for each 
macroeconomic variable for the behavioral model in the case of fixed  , and 
steady state inflation rate of 0, is also depicted as a dotted line for the sake of 
comparison. 
     Just as anticipated, when the steady state rate of inflation is set to 0 in the 
behavioral model, the effects of   disappear, and thus the response of 
macroeconomic variables displays a similar pattern to that of the standard New 
Keynesian model. Despite their similarities in terms of the shape of response 
path, the absolute size of the initial response of the behavioral model with 0 
steady state inflation is clearly different from that of the New Keynesian model. 
The first row of figure 11 displays the impulse response of macroeconomic 
variables to the demand shock. We can see that when the demand shock hits 
the economy, the inflation and the interest rate of the New Keynesian model 
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Keynesian model rises by 0.05 percent whereas the inflation of the behavioral 
model increases by only 0.02 percent. Moreover, approximately 2 quarters after 
the shock, the inflation falls below the steady state value and returns to its 
steady state 5 quarters after the shock. Likewise, the interest rate of the New 
Keynesian model rises by approximately 3 times more than that of the 
behavioral model. However, we can clearly see that output of the behavioral 
model responds far more than response of the output of the New Keynesian  
model. We can see that a demand shock induces output of the behavioral model 
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Now let us analyze the impulse responses to the monetary shock. From the 
second row of figure 11 we can see that the output and the interest rate of the 
New Keynesian model responds less to a monetary shock than that of the 
behavioral model. More specifically, the response of the output of the New 
Keynesian model is approximately 3 times larger than its response in the 
behavioral model, and the response of the interest rate of the New Keynesian 
model is twice larger than that of the behavioral model. However, after the 
immediate aftermath of the monetary shock, inflation of the New Keynesian 
model drops by 0.65 percent, while it only drops by 0.25 percent in the 
behavioral model.  
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figure 12: Bayesian Posterior IRF for the New Keynesian Model 
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The impulse response of output and interest rate to inflation shock displays 
similar pattern with the impulse response of output and interest  
rate to monetary shock. In both cases, the response of the variables of the 
behavioral model is larger than that of the New Keynesian model.  
     Table 3 gives an overview of our assumptions regarding the prior 
distributions of the estimated parameters. All the variances of the shocks are 
assumed to follow an Inverted Gamma distribution. Inverted Gamma 
distribution guarantees a positive variance with a rather large domain.  
     The coefficient of degree of price indexation,  , is described by a Beta 
distribution and has a prior mean of 0.3 with a standard error of 0.0415.   
follows Gamma distribution and is set around 0.4 and has a standard error of 
0.0004. The rest of the parameters are described by the same prior information 
as in table 1.  
      Table 4 summarizes the estimation results of the posterior distribution of 
the parameters from the standard New Keynesian model, obtained by the 
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. A sample of 50,000 draws was created, were the 
first 10,000 draws were neglected.  
    From our Bayesian estimation results, we can see that the prior mean value 
and the posterior mean value of   differ significantly. The prior mean value of   
equals 0.3 whereas its posterior mean equals 0.0527. Another interesting 
observation from the posterior estimation is the posterior mean value of  . 
Whereas the prior mean value of   is 0.4, its posterior mean value equals 0.0452. 
Since   denotes the composite parameter that depends on the degree of price 
stickiness and firms‟ production technology, a smaller value of   implies that 
inflation is less affected by the aggregate output. This in turn implies that 
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according to our posterior estimation, prices are more rigid. The rest of the 
parameters also display some variation between the prior mean and the 
posterior mean. The analysis for the rest of the parameters is similar to the 
analysis given for table 2.  
     Figure 12 reports the posterior impulse response functions of macroeconomic 
variables for the standard New Keynesian model. From the comparison of this 
model‟s regular impulse response function in figure 11, we can clearly see that 
despite their alikeness in the shape of the response, the magnitude of the 
response to shocks in figure 11 and figure 12 differs significantly.    
     Interestingly, all three variables, namely the inflation, output, and interest 
rate, show greater response to the demand shock in their posterior estimation. 
Immediately after the demand shock, the posterior inflation rises by roughly 1 
percent. This response of inflation is nearly twice as large as the response of 
inflation in figure 13. Likewise, the respond of the posterior interest rate is also 
nearly twice as large as that of figure 13. The posterior estimation of the 
response of output to demand shock exhibits a striking difference from the prior 
impulse response. The demand shock raises the posterior output by 
approximately 30 percent while it raises the prior output by only 0.9 percent.  
     The magnitude of posterior impulse response of inflation, output and 
interest rate to monetary shock are all less than their prior impulse response.  
This may be partly due to the fact that the posterior mean value of themonetary 
shock is less than its prior mean value. The prior mean value of  
the monetary shock is 1.000 whereas its posterior mean equals 0.5881. This 
difference in the size of the monetary shock could have resulted in a weaker 
response of macroeconomic variables to the shock.  
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     Likewise, a greater posterior mean value of the mark-up shock has resulted 
in a greater response of the posterior inflation, output and interest rate to the 
inflation shock. The posterior inflation shock takes the value of 2.5718, which is 
nearly 2.5 times larger than its prior mean value. The immediate posterior 
impulse response of inflation to    is roughly 2.5 times larger than that of prior 
inflation. Similarly, the immediate posterior impulse responses of output and 
interest rates also display responses that are approximately 2.5 ~ 3 times larger 
than their prior responses.  
 
 
5.2      New Keynesian Phillips Curve  
with Positive Trend Inflation  
 
     Now let us compare the impulse response functions of the behavioral model 
with those of the New Keynesian model when the steady state rate of inflation 
equals 5 percent. Once again, the IS equation and the Taylor rule are given 
equally as in Rotemberg‟s (2005) behavioral model.  
     Each firm, according to the Calvo framework, adjusts its price in each period 
with probability      . Suppose that each firm‟s production function is given 
by  
  
                       
  
where   is the labor income share that satisfies        
     A firm chooses its price at period  ,       to maximize the value function such 
that 
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where         
  
  
    
 
  
 is the real stochastic discount factor.  
     The first order condition of this maximization problem is 
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where        
 
             and    is the gross inflation rate.  
     Log-linearizing equation (2) around the steady state, we obtain the optimal 
relative price that is given by 
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The aggregate price level then becomes 
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Rewriting this expression yields 
 62 
 
                 
          
                                                                     (26) 
 
Notice that this equation is equivalent to equation (18) of the behavioral model.  
         when the steady state rate of inflation is greater than 1. This is due to 
the fact that in the steady state, the presence of trend inflation erodes relative 
prices determined by firms in the past. Log linearization of equation (26) yields 
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where           
     Equation (27) implies that inflation depends on the price set by firms in the 
current period (given by (25)), and a second term proportional to log-deviations 
in competitiveness. This second term is present only if the trend inflation is 
non-zero. Using equations (25) and (27), the reduced-form expression for the 
New Keynesian Phillips curve in the presence of positive trend inflation 
becomes 
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with the following expressions for the coefficients: 
 
  
        
   
 
 
    





TABLE 5 – PRIOR DISTRIBUTIONS FOR DSGE MODEL PRAMETERS  
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TABLE 6 – PARAMETER ESTIMATION RESULTS  
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Details of the derivation of the Phillips curve with positive inflation is provided 
in Appendix.  
     Table 5 and 6 report an overview of the prior distributions of the parameters 
of the New Keynesian model with positive trend inflation, and their estimation 
results.  
     Figure 13 reports the impulse response functions of macroeconomic variables 
for the New Keynesian model when trend inflation equals 5 percent. The 
impulse responses of the behavioral model are also displayed in a dotted line for 
the ease of comparison. As we have anticipated, the impulse response functions  
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figure 13: Bayesian Posterior IRF for the New Keynesian Model with Positive Steady 
State Inflation   
 
 
Details of the derivation of the Phillips curve with positive inflation is provided 
in Appendix.  
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of two different model display strikingly similar patterns. The only notable 
difference between the impulse responses of two models can be seen in the 
response patterns to monetary shocks. 
     In the immediate aftermath of the monetary shock, the inflation of the New 
Keynesian model drops by 0.1 percent whereas the inflation of the behavioral 
model decreases by roughly 0.2 percent.  
     However, the output and the interest rate of the New Keynesian model 
shows greater response to the monetary shock than that of the behavioral 
model. Immediately after the monetary shock, the output of the New Keynesian 
model drops by 1.4 percent while its counterpart of the behavioral model drops 
by 1.1 percent. Moreover, the response of the interest rate of the New 
Keynesian model is also slightly larger than that of the behavioral model.  
 
 
6     Conclusion 
 
     In this paper, we analyzed the nature of price stickiness by analyzing the 
price setting behavior of firms. Although standard macroeconomics often rely on 
fixed administrative costs of price adjustment to account for price rigidity, we 
have studied several recent models that attempt to explain price rigidity though 
psychological and emotional aspects that affect people‟s decisions. In particular, 
we have shown that Rotembeg‟s model of consumer anger at price increases can 
give explanations for the observed price stickiness. Moreover, thorough 
Bayesian estimation methods, we analyzed how macroeconomic variables 
respond to demand, inflation, and monetary shocks under such behavioral price 
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setting. The comparison of estimated results to the results of the standard New 
Keynesian model allowed us to conclude that when the steady state rate of 
inflation equals zero, the behavioral model and the standard New Keynesian 
model display similar impulse response patterns, albeit they exhibit some 
differences in the magnitude of the response. When the steady state rate of 
inflation is positive, the impulse response functions of the behavioral and the 
New Keynesian model displayed strikingly similar patterns and responses. For 
future research, we hope to incorporate capital into Rotemberg‟s behavioral 
price setting model and see by how much the estimated results would differ 




7     Appendix 
 
A.     Bayesian Estimation of DSGE Models 
 
     Bayesian statistics offers a subjective view about probability in a sense that 
it allows to incorporate prior information from outside the samples. In practice, 
Bayesian statistics usually points to constructing estimates of the distribution 
of unobserved parameters conditional on the data. 
     Consider a model with a vector of parameters    The Bayesian approach to 
parameter estimation is to treat   as a random variable. Before observing the 
actual data, a researcher may have prior information about the parameters 
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based on logic, intuition, or past analysis. These initial ideas about the 
parameter, called prior distributions, are represented by a probability density 
on   and is denoted by       After gathering data               the researcher 
updates his ideas about   based on the gathered sample information. This 
updated idea about   is represented by a new probability density,       , and is 
called the posterior distribution. Since this posterior distribution incorporates 
the information from the observed sample, it obviously depends on Y.  
     The equation that shows how the researcher‟s ideas about   change after 
observing the data is established by Bayes‟ rule. According to Bayes‟ theorem, 
 
                                 
 
which implies that 
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Since the marginal probability of       , is a constant with respect to  , it can be 
stated that the posterior distribution is proportional to the prior distribution 
times the likelihood function: 
 
                             
 
     In Bayesian data analysis, one approach to apply a model to data is to find 
parameter estimates that maximize the posterior probability of the parameters 
given the data, i.e. the mode of the posterior distribution. This procedure is 
similar to the maximum likelihood estimation procedure, but differs in a sense 
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that the prior over parameters will influence parameter estimation. Another 
approach in Bayesian analysis, which we applied in this paper, is posterior 
sampling. Unlike the first approach that simply finds the mode of the posterior 
distribution, the goal is to characterize the full posterior distribution. In many 
cases, we are unable to obtain analytic expressions for the posterior distribution, 
and thus have to resort to sampling techniques, such as Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo (MCMC), to obtain samples from posterior distribution. The samples 
obtained from MCMC can be used to calculate various statistics, such as mean, 
variances, and other moments of the distribution. The most general algorithm 
for simulating        is the Metropolis sampler.  
 
 
     The Random-Walk Metropolis Algorithm 
 
     The goal of this procedure is to sample from the posterior distribution. The 
Metropolis sampler generates a Markov chain that produces a sequence of 
values of parameter: 
 
                             
 
where    denotes the state of a Markov chain at iteration t. The samples from 
the chain, after the burn-in, reflect samples from the posterior distribution. The 




1. Set     
 
2. Generate an initial arbitrary value of    
 
3. Update from    to      by 
 
3.1 Generate              
 
3.2 Define 
                                            
       
       
    
        
3.3 Generate   from a Uniform (0, 1) distribution 
 
3.4 If    , accept the proposal and set         
   else set 
          
 
4. Repeat Step 3 T  times. 
 
Now we know how to find the posterior distribution of the vector of parameters 
   Another issue that arises when conducting a Bayesian estimation of a DSGE 
model is the evaluation of the likelihood function.  
     Given initial parameter values, the Kalman filter can be used to recursively 
construct the likelihood function for state space models. The likelihood function 
can be expressed in terms of the one-step ahead forecast errors, conditional on 
the initial observations, and of their recursive variance, both of which can be 
obtained with the use of the Kalman filter.  
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B.     Tables and Figures 
 
Figure B.1-I: Priors and Posteriors of the Behavioral Model when the 





Figure B.1-II: Priors and Posteriors of the Behavioral Model when the 
steady state rate of inflation equals 5 percent 
 
 
Figure B.2: Smoothed shocks of the Behavioral Model 
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Figure B.3-II: Univariate Diagnostic of the Behavioral Model (Brooks 









Figure B.3-III: Univariate Diagnostic of the Behavioral Model (Brooks 









Figure B.3-IV: Univariate Diagnostic of the Behavioral Model (Brooks 





























TABLE B.7 – PRIOR DISTRIBUTIONS FOR DSGE MODEL PRAMETERS   
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TABLE B.8 – PARAMETER ESTIMATION RESULTS   
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C.     Derivation of the closed-form New Keynesian       
         Phillips Curve under positive trend inflation 
 
     In order to obtain the closed-form New Keynesian Phillips curve under 
positive trend inflation, we set terms         in (25), and use the following 
relations where     is the lead operator: 
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where       
    and       
      
     Then, equation (25) can be rewritten as 
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Using (C-1) ~ (C-3), we get                                         
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Using (C-4) and (27), and multiplying through terms involving the lead operator, 
we get the New Keynesian Phillips curve with positive inflation as 
 
                
           
                 
 
                                                  
 
with the following expressions for the coefficients: 
 
  
        
   
 
 
    
                    
  
   
    
 
  
    
   
 
 
    




   
 
 
    
                              
         
      
     
      










Behavioral model with variable    
and steady state inflation of 5 percent 
 
MATRIX OF COVARIANCE OF EXOGENOUS SHOCKS 
Variables    e_y       e_i       e_p        
e_y          1.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
e_i          0.000000  1.000000  0.000000 
e_p          0.000000  0.000000  1.000000 
  
POLICY AND TRANSITION FUNCTIONS 
                ninfla         y            i         nalpha 
i(-1)         -0.055173    -3.737715     0.850344    -1.642474 
ninfla(-1)     0.648899    -6.773044     0.584009    -17.835685 
e_y            0.003002     0.968670     0.002701     0.089356 
e_i           -0.061304    -4.153017     0.944827    -1.824971 
e_p          0.581330      -6.067777     0.523197    -2.540410 
 
THEORETICAL MOMENTS 
VARIABLE       MEAN      STD. DEV.  VARIANCE    
ninfla         0.0000     0.7604     0.5783 
y              0.0000    13.6646   186.7212 
i              0.0000     2.4940     6.2202 








VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION (in percent) 
            e_y     e_i     e_p      
ninfla      0.00    9.47   90.53 
y           0.50   19.27   80.22 
i           0.00   35.88   64.12 
nalpha      0.01    4.09   95.91 
 
 
MATRIX OF CORRELATIONS 
Variables    ninfla   y        i     nalpha    
ninfla       1.0000 -0.5071  0.1905 -0.6499 
y           -0.5071  1.0000 -0.9396  0.7655 
i            0.1905 -0.9396  1.0000 -0.6214 
nalpha      -0.6499  0.7655 -0.6214  1.0000 
 
COEFFICIENTS OF AUTOCORRELATION 
Order     1       2       3       4       5        
ninfla    0.6144  0.3372  0.1467  0.0230 -0.0512 
y         0.8322  0.6666  0.5135  0.3805  0.2706 
i         0.8843  0.7417  0.5956  0.4598  0.3415 
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거시경제학이 합리성으로부터 벗어나야 한다는 주장이 제기되면서, 많은 
경제학자들이 인간의 행동과 심리의 관찰을 통하여 경제 현실을 설명하려는 시도를 
해왔다.  정통 거시경제학에서는 가격 경직성을 메뉴비용으로 설명하기도 하며, 
중첩가격모형을 통해 가격의 경직성을 설명하는 것이 대세를 이룬다. 그러나 
마케팅 조사에 따르면 기업들이 가격을 경직적으로 유지하는 주 된 이유는 가격을 
올림으로 고객들의 심기를 불편하게 하는 일이 발생하지 않도록 하기 위함으로 
드러났다. 가격상승으로 인해 화가 난 소비자들이 불매 운동을 벌이면 기업 
입장에서 큰 손해이기 때문이다.  본 논문에서는 최근의 행동 경제학적 모형들을 
살펴본다. 특히 행동적 측면이 부가된 동태적 확률적 일반 균형 모형들을 위주로 
살펴본다. 이러한 행동적 가격 책정 모형의 현실 설명력을 확인하기 위해 본 
논문에서는 Rotemberg (2005)의 모형을 로그-선형 하여 데이터를 이용하여 
베이지안 추정을 한다. 베이지안 추정을 통해 얻어진 결과를 일반적인 뉴케인지안 
모형과 비교를 하여 충격에 대한 경제 변수들의 반응이 어떠한지를 상세히 
비교한다. 추정 결과의 비교를 통하여 내릴 수 있는 결론은, 행동경제학적 가격-
책정 모형의 충격반응곡선이 일반적인 뉴케인지안 모형의 충격반응곡선과 상당히 
다르다는 점이다. 또한 행동경제학적 모형의 주요 차이점인 가격 변화 확률을 
고정시키면 일반적인 칼보 모형과 같은 결과를 얻을 수 있음을 확인한다.  
 
주요어:  행동적 동태확률일반균형; 합당한 가격 책정; 소비자 분노; 이타주의 모수; 
칼보 가격 책정; 베이지안 추정. 
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